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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Seize first, ask questions later. Operation Polar Cap and
the Hawaii All Monies Cases
Based on sworn testimony that 680 bank accounts in the United
States containing nearly $400 million' were the "operating accounts"
* A.B. magna cum laude, Princeton University; J.D. cum laude, University of
Florida; attorney at law, Richey, Munroe, Fine, Goodman & Armstrong, P.A., Miami,
Florida. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Andre Lebrecht, attorney
at law, Prager, Dreifuss & Lehner, Zurich, Switzerland for his legal and factual
research.
1. Mary Hladky, Lawyers of Many Stripes Watch Money Seizure Cases in Ha-
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of the Medellin cartel, U.S. District Judge William C. O'Kelley issued
an order temporarily restraining them on April 16, 1990.2 Within
weeks almost 580 of those accounts were released.3 The government
then sought civil forfeiture of the remaining 100 accounts, 88 of which
were in the Southern District of Florida representing in excess of $17.6
million." Almost two years later, claims to 82 of those accounts have
been fully resolved returning 94 percent of the funds seized. The dis-
pute over one account has been partially resolved returning thus far 86
percent of its funds. Approximately $830,000 has been forfeited and
less than one million dollars is still in dispute.'
In May, 1989, the federal government sought civil forfeiture of
twenty-four bank accounts seized in Miami and New York and trans-
ferred to Hawaii in what has become known as the All Monies cases.6
waii, MIAMI REVIEW, May 11, 1990, at 1, 4.
2. United States v. Pablo Emilio Escobar-Gaviria, Cr. No. 89-086-A (N.D. Ga.,
April 16, 1990). This order was entered pursuant to 21 U.S.C. section 853(e)(2)
(Supp. 1992) which provides for a temporary restraining order against the property of
a defendant in a criminal case when an information or indictment has not yet been filed
seeking forfeiture of the property. The issuance of such an order requires the govern-
ment to demonstrate probable cause to believe that the property would, in the event of
the owner's conviction on the imminent criminal charges, be subject to forfeiture. In
other words, the 680 bank accounts were seized based on the false verification that they
were owned by the defendants in the criminal case pending in Atlanta, Georgia. See
United States v. Eighty-Eight (88) Designated Accounts Containing Monies Traceable
to Exchanges for Controlled Substances, 740 F. Supp. 842, 844 n.2, 850-51 (S.D. Fla.
1990) [hereinafter Eighty-Eight Designated Accounts].
3. Mike McQueen, Prosecutors Face Tough Questioning on Frozen Funds, THE
MIAMI HERALD, June 9, 1990, at 4B.
4. United States v. Eighty-Eight (88) Designated Accounts Containing Monies
Traceable to Exchanges for Controlled Substances, No. 90-1203-Civ-NESBITT (S.D.
Fla. - amended Complaint filed May 21, 1990).
5. Of the 78 claimants who have settled with the government, the following chart
shows the number of claims corresponding to the percentage of funds returned:
100% 95-99% 90-94% 75-89% 66-74% 50-65 %
44 13 9 8 2 2
In addition, four accounts were forfeited in full: two were by default, in one case the
claim was withdrawn; and one forfeiture was by stipulation. Of the total $830,000
forfeited, more than half, $450,000, was by one claimant who settled with respect to
seven Miami accounts and an unknown number of New York accounts.
6. All of the cases are styled United States v. All Monies [the amount seized] In
Account No. [ ] [name of claimant]. For ease of reference, after the initial full cita-
tion, these cases will be hereinafter referred to as All Monies - [name of the claimant].
The cases were filed in Hawaii as a result of a criminal indictment concerning
1126 [Vol. 16
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Of the $11.3 million seized from the twenty-four accounts, the federal
government has returned in excess of $9.5 million. The federal govern-
ment lost three cases on the merits, two on improper venue grounds,
and settled the remainder. The federal government was able to retain
the accounts of the drug trafficker, which it won by default.'
In 1991 alone, more than $643 million in cash and property was
"stripped from drug traffickers and other criminals" by the United
States government.8 As the claimants in the Polar Cap and All Monies
cases can testify, some of that money came from innocent owners who
succumbed to the economic reality (some would say coercion) that the
cost of litigating a civil forfeiture case can often exceed the amount at
issue. Mforeover, victory in such cases very rarely leads to the recovery
of attorney's fees. 9
drug trafficking filed in Hawaii. See United States v. Emilio Melendez-Bernal, No. 89-
00647 DAE (D. Haw. 1989). Melendez was convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine
into the United States.
7. The author would like to express his appreciation to Hendrik Milne, Esquire,
for his assistance in providing information about, and unreported memorandum deci-
sions in, the All Monies cases. The statistics referred to in the text are derived from his
Reply Brief for Appellant at 15, United States v. All Monies ($572,426.63) in Account
Number 2785800-1 in the Name of Wadi Kahhat, appealfiled, Nos. 91-15847, 91-
15944, and 91-16159 (9th Cir. Feb. 19, 1992). With attorney's fees and interest, the
government may return to claimants, in the aggregate, more than 95 percent of the
amount of money it seized.
8. DEP'T OF JUSTICE ASSET FORFEITURE PROGRAM ANN. REP. 8 (Mar. 30, 1992).
The number of asset forfeitures has grown at an average annual rate of 99% since
1985. Since 1985 more than $2.4 billion ,orth of property has been forfeited. Signifi-
cantly, most of this money has been reinvested in law enforcement. Id. In other words,
those agencies involved in a forfeiture receive a portion of the proceeds. More than
$830 million in forfeited property has been shared with state and local law enforcement
agencies. Id. at Foreword. This "reinvestment' process gives an entirely new meaning
to the expression "you 'eat what you kill." Further, the inclusion of this profit like
motive calls into question the neutrality of law enforcement. No longer are police and
special agents just "doing their job." Now they are working for increased resources
including, in particular, larger budgets. See Winn, Seizures of Private Property in the
War Against Drugs: What Process is Due?, 41 Sw. L.J. 1111 , 1127-28 (1988).
9. In Operation Polar Cap, the government was ordered to pay the attorneys'
fees of one claimant under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. section 2412,
because it seized and attempted to forfeit more than $106,000 when its best argument
for probable cause entitled it to seize only $13,600. United States v. Eight-eight (88)
Designated Accounts, 740 F. Supp. 842 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
In an All Monies case, thus far the government has been ordered to pay one
claimant his attorney's fees. U.S. v. All Monies ($637,944.57) in Account No. 29-
0101-62 (Abusada), No. 89-00386 DAE (D. Haw. September 11, 1991)."
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Both established and emerging legal principles are being applied to
the civil forfeiture of bank accounts pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §
881(a)(6)'0 and 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A)"I with uncertain results.
Section 881(a)(6) seizures are based on allegations that a bank ac-
count, or its contents, are traceable proceeds of an exchange for narcot-
ics or were used to facilitate drug trafficking. Title 18 U.S.C. §
981(a)(l)(A) provides for seizure of monies or other property which
was involved in a money laundering transaction. 2 There are several
defenses which an owner of a bank account may interpose to recover
his seized funds. The innocent owner defense under both applicable
statutes and, in proceeds cases, the lowest intermediate balance defense
are the principle defenses.'" This article analyzes the basis for, and de-
10. Title 21 U.S.C. section 881(a)(6) (Supp. 1992) makes the following property
subject to forfeiture:
All monies, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value fur-
nished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a con-
trolled substance in violation of the subchapter, all proceeds traceable to
such an exchange, and all monies, negotiable instruments, and securities
used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of the subchapter,
except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the ex-
tent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission estab-
lished by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the
knowledge or consent of that owner.
id.
11. 18 U.S.C. section 981(a)(l)(A) (Supp. 1992) makes the following property
subject to forfeiture:
Any property, real or personal, involved in a transaction or attempted
transaction in violation of section 5313(a) or 5324 of title 31, or of section
1956 or 1957 of this title, or any property traceable to such property.
However, no property shall be seized or forfeited in the case of a violation
of section 4313(a) of title 31 by a domestic financial institution regulated
by the Securities and Exchange Commission or a partner, director or em-
ployee thereof.
id.
12. By property involved in a money laundering transaction, I refer to all four
predicate crimes in 18 U.S.C. section 981(a)(l)(A): section 1956 [money laundering],
section 1957 [engaging in monetary transactions and property derived from specified
unlawful activity], 31 U.S.C. section 5313(a) [currency transaction reporting require-
ment], and 31 U.S.C. section 5324 [prohibiting structuring transactions to evade the
reporting requirement of 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a)]. Section 981(a) also provides for the
forfeiture of property derived from many other acts including certain acts which are
violations of the law of a foreign jurisdiction. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(B),(C),(D),
and (E) (Supp. 1992).
13. Claimants to any type of property sought to be forfeited under these statutes
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fenses to, seizures of bank accounts funded with purchases of U.S. dol-
lars on the parallel markets of Latin America.
B. Procedure in Civil Forfeiture Cases
Civil forfeiture proceedings follow the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure except where they are inconsistent with the Supplemental Rules
for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims.1 4 Typically, the govern-
ment seizes a bank account, in whole or in part, with a seizure warrant
based on a verified application and later files a verified complaint for
forfeiture in rem to initiate civil forfeiture proceedings." The distin-
guishing characteristic of such a proceeding is that it is "in rem." The
defendant is the property to be forfeited, the property is the "guilty"
party.le The government may seize property without proof of the
may also raise defenses of undue delay and the property's non-involvement in the al-
leged illegal activity.
14. Title 21 U.S.C. section 881(b) and Title 18 U.S.C. section 981(d) incorpo-
rate the procedure of the customs laws. The customs laws in turn are governed by the
Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims which provide for the
application of the Rules of Civil Procedure except to the extent they are inconsistent
with the Supplemental Rules. SUPPLEMENTAL RULE A. One significant consequence of
the application of the Supplemental Rules is that the pleading requirement is more
stringent than the liberal notice pleading of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. See
SUPPLEMENTAL RULE E(2). The particularity requirement has been honored by some
courts because of the drastic consequence of the government seizing and holding prop-
erty. See United States v. $38,000 in United States Currency, 816 F.2d 1538, 1548
(I Ith Cir 1987) (government may not seize and continue to hold property upon con-
clusory allegations that defendant property is forfeitable); United States v. $39,000 in
Canadian Currency, 801 F.2d 1210, 1216-19 (10th Cir. 1986).
15. The other common method of seizure is when the government files a verified
complaint for forfeiture in rem and obtains an ex-parte warrant of arrest in rem simul-
taneously. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (Supp. 1991), 18 U.S.C. § 981(d) (Supp. 1991).
This article will discuss only judicial forfeitures because of the relative infrequency of
administrative forfeitures of bank accounts and the consequent lack of ability to ana-
lyze the deliberative process involved in administrative determinations. At a recent
seminar there was a discussion of a not yet implemented Department of Treasury deci-
sion to use administrative forfeiture for bank accounts of less than $500,000. If imple-
mented, this policy would move most bank account seizures into the administrative
realm.
16. See Piety, Scorched Earth: How the Expansion of Civil Forfeiture Doctrine
Has Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 911, 916-927 (1991) (explain-
ing how property can be "guilty" and a thorough critique of civil forfeiture doctrine);
Winn, supra note 8; Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspective on Deo-
dands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP
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owner's complicity in the illegal conduct subjecting the property to
forfeiture.
Civil forfeitures are hybrids of criminal, civil and admiralty prac-
tice. After the concept of guilty or tainted property, the most unusual
aspect of civil forfeiture procedure is the burden of proof structure. As
plaintiff, the government has the initial burden of demonstrating the
existence of probable cause to believe that a substantial connection ex-
ists between the property to be forfeited and the underlying criminal
activity. 17 The government's burden of proof is not to establish forfeita-
bility beyond reasonable doubt, nor by clear and convincing evidence,
nor by preponderance of the evidence. Rather, to show probable cause
to believe that property is subject to forfeiture, the government's bur-
den is less than prima facie proof, but more than mere suspicion.1 "
The nature of probable cause in civil forfeiture cases has four at-
tributes: First, it is the same legal standard as that applied in a crimi-
nal context for arrests and search and seizure warrants. 19 Second, as in
the criminal context, the government may prove probable cause using
hearsay which would be excluded by the Federal Rules of Evidence in
a typical civil case.2" Third, the court, not a jury, determines probable
cause. 2 Fourth, in determining probable cause, judges must view the
evidence not with clinical detachment, but by applying their common
sense to the realities of normal life. 22
Once the government demonstrates probable cause, the burden of
proof shifts to the claimant.23 In order to prevail, the claimant must
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property sought
to be forfeited (e.g., all or certain funds in a bank account) was not
L.Q. 169 (1973).
17. United States v. $4,255,000, 762 F.2d 895, 903 (lth Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 747 U.S. 1056 (1986).
18. Id.
19. United States v. Premises and Real Property at 4492 S. Livonia Rd., Livo-
nia, New York, 889 F.2d 1258, 1267 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1017
(1991).
20. U.S. v. Property Known as 6109 Grubb Road, 886 F.2d 618, 622 (3d Cir.
1989).
21. 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (Supp. 1992).
22. $4,255,000, 762 F.2d. at 904; Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227 (11th Cir.
1985); United States v. Herzbrun, 723 F.2d 773, 775 (1 1th Cir. 1984). For example,
the Eleventh Circuit allowed, in effect, judicial notice of "the fact that Miami has
become a center for drug smuggling and money laundering." $4,255,000, 762 F.2d at
904.
23. 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (Supp. 1992).
1130 [Vol. 16
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used in violation of the applicable statute, or that he is an innocent
owner as defined in the applicable statute. 4 The claimant is entitled to
a jury trial conducted under the Federal Rules of Evidence on his af-
firmative defenses.2 5 A central feature of a parallel market bank ac-
count forfeiture case is explaining to the fact-finder the foreign client's
culture, especially the purchase of dollars on the parallel market.
II. LATIN AMERICAN PARALLEL MARKETS
A monetary parallel market 'is commonly understood to be a non-
government means of exchange of different national monies. Parallel
markets are also called black, grey and unofficial markets. The legality
of participating in a parallel market is a function of the law of the
country where the money is being traded .2  The parallel market is a
free market in the sense that one can purchase dollars at a negotiated
exchange rate, rather than at the official rate established by a foreign
government.
Money exchangers, known as cambistas in Latin America, operate
as brokers of funds, often not even taking possession of the dollars that
they sell. For example, a dollar purchaser pays his cambista local cur-
rency, check or wire transfer depending on the size of the transaction.
In return the cambista provides dollars in cash, money order, wire
transfer or check. Checks are usually from a third party with the
payee's name filled in at the time of the transaction. Wire transfers
come either from the cambista's account or directly from the account
24. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (Supp. 1992) and 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2) (Supp.
1992). See United States v. One Single Family Residence, 933 F.2d 976, 979 (11th
Cir. 1991); $4,255,000, 762 F.2d at '904; United States v. One 1944 Steel Hulk
Freighter, 697 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1983).
25. See United States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d 453, 469-71
(7th Cir. 1980) (Sprecker, J., dissenting).
26. For example, there is no prohibition under Peruvian law regarding the ex-
change of national monies. In Colombia prior to February, 1991, participation in the
parallel market was a "contravention cambiaria," a violation of the regulations gov-
erning exchange controls. Decreto 444 which established this regulation was in force
from 1967 through January, 1991. A violation of Decreto 444 was not a "delito," a
crime, and was not punishable by imprisonment. Rather, it was punishable by an ad-
ministrative sanction of forfeiture of the amount of money that was involved in the
transaction and a potential penalty of up to 200% of the amount forfeited. A person
who was sanctioned under this provision and did not pay their fine was subject to ad-
ministrative arrest and incarceration. Enforcement of this regulation was lax to say the
least. And as noted, it was repealed in February, 1991.
Fine 1131
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of the person from whom he is buying dollars.2 7
The demand for dollars is fueled by individuals and businesses who
need to maintain dollar accounts for a variety of reasons. Foreign indi-
viduals and businesses have held dollar accounts in the United States
for more than a century for different reasons including personal secur-
ity (i.e., concern over the lack of confidentiality of bank records which
has led to violence, extortion and kidnapping) and preservation of
wealth (due to the lack of stability of certain banking systems, high
levels of devaluation of local currencies against the dollar, tax avoid-
ance, and the perception of better investment opportunities available in
the United States). Latin American importers have also maintained
dollar accounts in the United States for a variety of reasons including a
desire to escape the cost, delay and bureaucratic inconvenience of buy-
ing dollars from the [United States] government. Furthermore,- the
money in these accounts is used to purchase contraband products be-
cause they are unable to buy dollars from an official source for these
purchases.28 Additionally, if the rate of exchange for dollars is more
favorable on the parallel market, people could easily purchase dollars
in the official market may choose to purchase on the parallel market.
Cambistas obtain their supply of dollars from the parallel market
in the form of cash, money orders and checks (usually with the payee
left blank) and wire transfers. Their sources include tourists needing
local currency, local residents who have received funds from family
members living abroad, the return of flight capital, the under-invoicing
of merchandise legitimately imported into their country, and sellers of
contraband including coffee, gold, emeralds, cattle and, 'of course,
drugs.
27. The account from which the cambista transfers dollars must, of course, be
located in a country which permits dollar denominated deposits. Cambistas operate
from a casa de cambio (money exchange) or simply, a cambio. Often, the dollar pur-
chaser does not pay the cambista until he receives the confirmation that his bank has
received the funds.
The reported decisions on the parallel market involve exchanges of dollars for Co-
lombian pesos or Peruvian intis. See $4,255,000, 762 F.2d at 899; United States v. All
Monies ($477,048.62) in Account No. 90-3617-3, Israel Discount Bank, New York
(Leloach), 754 F. Supp. 1467 (D. Haw. 1991).
28. Such products include electronics and clothing which are imported without
being registered and, therefore, without paying taxes or tariffs.
1132 [Vol.. 16
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III. APPLICATION OF CIVIL FORFEITURE STATUTES TO
DOMESTIC BANK ACCOUNTS
The civil forfeiture provisions of the Controlled Substance Act29
were amended in 1978 to include forfeiture of proceeds of illegal drug
transactions.3 0 The purpose of the amendment, codified at 21 U.S.C. §
881(a)(6), was to strengthen the attack on drug traffickers by confis-
cating their profits. 1
Bank accounts are subject to the risk of seizure when the United
States government believes they are sufficiently related to drug traffick-
ing or money laundering.32 In the simplest proceeds case, the govern-
ment may develop proof that a drug seller uses a bank account strictly
for the deposit of dollars earned in drug sales. The government can also
trace the proceeds if they are transferred to another account. The first
account, the account into which the funds obtained in exchange for the
drugs were placed, is called either a "primary" or a "direct recipient"
account. The account which receives the transfer of funds is called the
"secondary" or "indirect recipient" account. Under the above scenario
the direct recipient account would be subject to forfeiture as proceeds
traceable to an exchange for a controlled substance."3
As for the secondary account, the amount seizable " is equal to the
amount of money transferred into it from the direct recipient account,
or its account balance at the time of seizure, whichever is lower. These
29. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 21 U.S.C. § 853
(1970).
30. Comprehensive .Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, Pub. L. 95-633, 92
Stat. 3777 (1978).
31. See 124 CONG. REC. S23055-56 (1978) (comments of Senators Nunn and
Culver).
32. In particular, the dollars must be proceeds traceable to drug violations, used
to facilitate the violations, constitute property involved in money laundering transac-
tions or any property traceable to such money laundering property.
33. 21 U.S.C. section 881(a)(6) (Supp. 1992). Depending on the nature in which
the deposits to the direct recipient account were made (e.g., repeated cash deposits in
amounts less than $10,000 with intent to avoid the filing of currency transaction re-
ports) 18 U.S.C. section 981(a)(l)(A) (Supp. 1992) would also subject the direct re-
cipient account to forfeiture through the incorporation of 31 U.S.C. section 5324
(Supp. 1992) (structuring).
34. "Seizable" is used herein to denote the government's presumptive ability to
seize the asset and subject it to forfeiture proceedings. Since a claimant does not have
the opportunity to assert his defenses until after the seizure, "seizable" does not imply
"forfeitable."
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funds are seizable regardless of the secondary account owner's lack of
participation in, or even lack of knowledge of, the criminal activity
leading to the deposits into the direct recipient account.
A. Traceable Proceeds or "Follow the Dirty Money" 5
If a drug seller uses the cash he obtained in an exchange for drugs
to purchase a car, the car is seizable. Likewise, if he writes a check
from his account (the contents of which are exclusively proceeds of
drug transactions) to purchase a car, that car is also seizable as a pro-
ceed traceable to the original exchange for drugs.3 6 The federal govern-
ment may seize assets which are far removed in time, place and nature
from the original consideration earned from the illicit drug sale, pro-
vided it can trace the asset seized to the drug violations.3 7 In the con-
text of bank accounts, the government can also seize funds that have
been transferred through numerous bank accounts so long as the funds
seized are, in fact, traceable to drug violations. The government must
35. Although this traceable proceeds section discusses money earned from drug
sales, all of the principles discussed are equally applicable to money derived in violation
of one of the four predicate statutes enumerated in 18 U.S.C. section 981(a)(I)(A)
(Supp. 1992). That is to say, since the enactment of section 981(a)(1)(A), a broad
range of assorted criminal activity independent of narcotics may provide the initial
funds which may be traced and seized.
36. By the same token, the cash or funds used to pay for the asset purchased by
the drug dealer is also seizable. There is a debate concerning whether or not the gov-
ernment could forfeit both the cash and the asset purchased with the cash. See
$4,255,000, 762 F.2d at 905; United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154,
1161 (2d Cir. 1986).
37. See Joint Explanatory Statement of Titles 11 and 11, Psychotropic Sub-
stances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9518, 9522;
Banco Cafetero, 797 F.2d at 1158.
The government is not entitled, however, to seize bank accounts when it cannot
trace tainted funds into them. Although this proposition should be self-evident, in at
least three of the All Monies cases: All Monies (Abusada), supra note 9; All Monies
(Kahhat), No. CV-89-00687-HMF (D. Haw.); and United States v. All Monies
($76,285.91) in Account No. 95-6, in the Name of Henry Feiger, Civ. No. 89-00471-
HMF (D. Haw); the government did just that. The government claimed that there was
a connection between the defendant accounts and a money laundering operation based
on tenuous evidence which did not include the tracing of even a dollar from the money
laundering ring to the defendant accounts. See All Monies (Abusada), 746 F. Supp. at
1438; All Monies (Fieger), supra this note (March 5, 1990 - claimant's motion for
summary judgment on probable cause granted), set aside, (August 7, 1990 - granting
motion to dismiss on venue grounds); All Monies (Kahhat), supra this note (August 8,
1990 - summary judgment granted on reconsideration).
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have probable cause to connect the property with narcotics activity, but
it need not link the property to a specific transaction. 38 The government
does, however, have the burden of tracing a specific amount of money
into a secondary account it seizes. 39
If money is transferred from a secondary account after it receives
tainted funds, how can the funds traceable to those deposits be identi-
fied? The nature of the proof necessary for tracing has been the subject
of a limited number of reported decisions. The seminal case in this
area, United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama,40 adopted trust ac-
counting principles to analyze whether the funds seized by the govern-
ment were properly traceable to an exchange for narcotics in a section
881(a)(6) case. The court approved two approaches to determine
whether an account contained traceable proceeds: "drugs-in, last-out,"
38. See, e.g., $4,255,000, 762 F.2d at 903-04; Banco Cafetero, 979 F.2d at 1160.
Examine the government's burden: it must only show probable cause, that is less than
prima facie proof, to believe that a substantial connection exists between the property
to be forfeited and the applicable criminal activity without even having to prove any
specific drug violations and the government may prove probable cause with hearsay.
Even calling it a burden seems a misnomer.
39. United States v. William Savran & Associate, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 1165, 1183
(E.D.N.Y. 1991) (before the burden shifts to a claimant to show which funds in the
account were clean funds "the government must first demonstrate that a precise
amount of proceeds from the fraudulent scheme were deposited in a specific bank ac-
counts which also contained untainted funds ....") (emphasis in original) (citing D.
Smith, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE CASES, $ 4.03(4)(d) (1991)). Con-
tra United States v. All Funds and Other Prop., Acct. No. 031-217362, 661 F. Supp.
697, 700-701 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (claimants consisted of a felon convicted of laundering
in excess of $ 50,000,000, two corporations which he controlled and used in his money
laundering operation and another individual as receiver of the same company's assets;
probable cause for forfeiture of the accounts because of vast nature of money launder-
ing operation, no proof required as to any particular amount of money or account,
burden placed on claimants to show that funds were not drug proceeds). This court
cited Banco Cafetero Panama for placing the tracing burden on the claimants by selec-
tively quoting the decision: "The risk of uncertainty in determining the traceability of
[the money linked to drugs] is placed squarely on the claimant." Id. at 701 (citing
Banco Cafetero, 797 F.2d at 1161). However, the full sentence from Banco Cafetero is:
"Under the Congressional scheme, the risk of uncertainty in determining the traceabil-
ity of proceeds of drug sales is placed squarely on the claimant, once probable has been
established." Banco Cafetero, 797 F.2d at 1161. Moreover, in Banco Cafetero the gov-
ernment had traced specific amounts of drug money into the accounts and was resolv-
ing the issue of who bore the burden of distinguishing clean funds from dirty funds
after the government proved how much money in the accounts was dirty and there
were intervening transfers.
40. 797 F.2d 1154 (2d Cir. 1986).
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or "drugs-in, first-out."'" Since the enactment of section 981(a)(1)(A),
these approaches could be rephrased as "tainted money in - last out" or
"tainted money in - first out." These approaches are employed when a
tainted deposit cannot be closely matched with a tainted withdrawal.42
Assume $25,000 of proceeds of drug transactions withdrawn from
an account owned by a drug trafficker is used to purchase a car. The
car dealer then deposits the $25,000 into his dealership's account which
contained $100,000 in clean money at the time of the tainted deposit.
1. If there are no intervening transactions in the car dealership's
bank account between the deposit of the $25,000 and when the govern-
ment comes knocking, $25,000 from that account is seizable; 43
2. If the only transaction after the tainted deposit is the car deal-
ership's transfer of $10,000 out of its operating account to open a time
deposit, the government may seize $15,000 from the operating account
and the entire time deposit under the tainted money-in, first-out ap-
proach or, the government could seize $25,000 from the operating ac-
count under the tainted money-in, last-out approach; and
3. If the only transaction after the tainted deposit is the dealer-
ship's transfer of $120,000 from its operating account to open a time
deposit, the government may seize $25,000 from the time deposit under
the tainted money-in, first-out approach or the $5,000 balance remain-
ing in the operating account and $20,000 from the time deposit under
the tainted money-in, last-out approach.
An important limitation on the government's ability to seize funds
from a secondary account is known as the lowest intermediate balance
rule.44 Under this rule, no matter how much tainted money is put into
the account if, after the last tainted deposit, the account balance goes
to zero and then is brought back to a positive balance with clean funds
prior to the government's seizure of the account, no funds in the ac-
41. Id. at 1159. Banco Cafetero also discussed the accounting principle using a
pro rata share method which would taint that portion of any withdrawal corresponding
to the ratio of the amount of the tainted deposit to the funds in the account immedi-
ately after the deposit. Id. The pro rata share method was neither approved nor disap-
proved by the court.
42. Banco Cafetero assumes that if a tainted deposit can be precisely matched to
a withdrawal then that withdrawal is presumptively tainted and vice-versa. In such
instances there is no need to resort accounting principles.
43. Under a version of the facilitation theory in use by the government today and
approved by one federal judge, the government could seize and seek forfeiture of the
entire $125,000. See infra text accompanying notes 70-79.
44. Banco Cafetero, 792 F.2d at 1159.
1136 [Vol. 16
12
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 4
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss3/4
1992]
count are traceable proceeds. In other words, the lowest balance after
the last tainted deposit and before the seizure of the account will be the
most money the government could prove is traceable to an illegal
transaction.
Although no published opinion has applied the lowest intermediate
balance to limit the amount of forfeitable funds to something less than
a tainted deposit, numerous unreported decisions and settlements have
been based on the lowest intermediate balance rule."5 This rule is
viewed as an affirmative defense to a seizure because it is used to rebut
the government's claim to have seized tainted funds. The claimant al-
ways has the right to prove that the government was simply wrong and
that the funds seized are not tainted. The lowest intermediate balance
rule provides the claimant with one very straight forward way of limit-
ing the amount of forfeitable funds.
In situations where the government has not had access to the ac-
count records prior to seizure, this burden is appropriately placed on
the claimant.' 6 However, if the government has in fact had access to
the account's records demonstrating the lowest intermediate balance
defense prior to seizure, the claimant will be able to show that the gov-
ernment did not have probable cause to seize any funds in excess of the
lowest intermediate balance.' 7 Likewise, if the government purports to
have traced funds from a direct recipient account through one or more
indirect recipient accounts prior to the deposit into the claimant's ac-
count, then the government, in order to show probable cause to seize
funds from the claimant's account, should have the burden of establish-
45. In United States v. Proceeds Deposited in Account No. 01008054, Bank of
Credit and Commerce International, No. 88-1581-Civ-T13(C) (M.D. Fla. February 8,
1990) (granting summary judgment in favor of the claimant on the basis that a nega-
tive balance in the interim between the deposit of the tainted funds and the govern-
ment's seizure of the account was proof that none of the funds in the defendant account
at the time of the seizure were tainted proceeds; $400,000 was returned to the
claimant).
This author is personally familiar with dozens of cases which have been settled by
applying the lowest intermediate balance theory to the facts alleged by the government.
Often this leads to the return of all or all but a small portion of the funds in an ac-
count. For example, in Eight-eight (88) Designated Accounts, supra note 3, at least
thirty-two claims were resolved by agreement based on the application of the lowest
intermediate balance rule returning $1,912,084.08 to the claimants.
46. See, e.g., Banco Cafetero, 797 F.2d at 1161.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Gavilan, 849 F.2d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 1988)
(allowing award of attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access Justice Act (EAJA),
28 U.S.C. section 2412, where the government knew of clear affirmative defense).
Fine 1137
13
Fine: Of Forfeiture, Facilitation and Foreign Innocent Owners: Is a Ban
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Nova Law Review
ing that the funds actually deposited in the claimant's account were
tainted under the applicable tracing rules including lowest intermediate
balance. After all, it is the government, not the claimant, who has ac-
cess to the account records of the intervening accounts prior to the
seizure."'
B. Facilitation, or "Follow the Dirty Money and Watch It
Grow"
Under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) any money used or intended to be
used to facilitate any violation of the Controlled Substances Act is sub-
ject to forfeiture. The sole reported decision concerning facilitation in a
§ 881(a)(6) bank account seizure, United States v. All Monies
($477,048.62) in Account No. 90-3617-3 (Leloach),"9 found that prop-
erty was "used to facilitate" if it made "the underlying criminal activ-
ity less difficult or more or less free from obstruction or hinderance."50
The court also found that the connection between the property to be
forfeited and the illegal activity must be "substantial," that is, more
than incidental or fortuitous, but not necessarily indispensable to the
commission of the offense.5 1
48. Indeed, if the records of such intervening transfers are available to the gov-
ernment for tracing purposes, the records of the account balances should also be availa-
ble. In such a case, the government's failure to apply the lowest intermediate balance
rule, if appropriate, to limit the amount eventually seized, could subject the govern-
ment to sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure II for failure to conduct a
reasonable inquiry into the facts giving rise to probable cause. Recovery for a claimant
in such circumstances might also be available under EAJA, or if the government fails
to obtain a certificate of reasonable cause (28 U.S.C. § 2465).
49. 754 F. Supp. 1467 (D. Haw. 1991).
50. Id. at 1473 (citing United States v. Schifferli, 895 F.2d 987, 990 (4th Cir.
1990)).
51. Id. (citing Schifferli, 895 F.2d at 989-90 and United States v. Premises
Known as 3639-2nd Street, N.E., 869 F.2d 1093, 1096 (8th Cir. 1989). In Schifferli, a
dentist's office was forfeited pursuant to 21 U.S.C. section 881(a)(7) which provides
that all real property which is used to commit or to facilitate the commission of a
violation of the Controlled Substances Act is forfeitable. The dentist was convicted of
writing illegal prescriptions and his office was forfeited because it made it easier for
him to hold himself out as a person authorized to write prescriptions. Schifferli, 895
F.2d at 991.
In United States v. Rivera, 884 F.2d 544 (1 1th Cir. 1989), the government sought
criminal forfeiture pursuant to 21 U.S.C. section 853(a)(2) of a ranch and all of the
assets associated with it on the basis that the rancher used his ranch as a cover for a
heroin distribution business. The rancher was convicted and the jury found that his
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In All Monies (Leloach), the claimant, Henry Leloach, was a
cambista in Peru who used the defendant account both to receive dol-
lars sent by his customers purchasing intis, and to send dollars to his
customers purchasing dollars. At the time of seizure approximately
one-half of the funds in the defendant account were proceeds directly
traceable to the bank account of a narcotics trafficker containing the
proceeds of his crimes. The government was able to establish probable
cause for forfeiture of the entire account using the facilitation theory
based on the following facts:
1. Melendez, a man convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine into
the United States, identified the defendant account as one that he
"controlled.15 2 Melendez was a partner in Dirimex, another Peruvian
casa de cambio,
twenty-seven quarter horses were used to facilitate his drug trafficking but, interest-
ingly, rejected the government's contention that the ranch was also used to facilitate
the crimes. Id. at 546. The rancher used the ranch's telephone to transact most of his
drug business and tape recordings of those telephone conversations revealed that he
bought and distributed heroin using code words, the same words that he used to con-
duct his horse breeding business: "horses," "halters," "bails of hay," and "lead lines."
Id.
There are numerous decisions upholding the forfeiture of conveyances, usually
automobiles, on the basis of their facilitation of the narcotics transaction even though
their involvement was indirect. See, e.g., United States v. One 1977 Lincoln V Coupe,
643 F.2d 154, 157 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 818 (1981) (automobile forfeitable
because its presence "with its hood up" provided a convenient cover whereas two men
alone in an alley might have appeared suspicious); United States v. One 1968 Ford
LTD Four Door, 425 F.2d 1084, 1085 (5th Cir. 1970) (car forfeitable because it ran
interference for fleeing felons); United States v. 1980 BMW 3201, 559 F. Supp. 382,
385 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (car forfeitable because it provided a means of surveillance, was
the look-out car); United States v. One Mercury Cougar XR-7, 666 F.2d 228, 230 (5th
Cir. 1982) (car forfeitable because it laid the groundwork for the illegal activity by
transporting the participants to search for a landing strip and storage building for the
marijuana to be received).
Title 21 U.S.C. sections 881(a)(4) and (a)(7), however, have broader facilitation
language than that found in sections 881(a)(6) or 18 U.S.C. section 981(a)(l)(A).
Section 881 (a)(4), after referring to the property to be forfeited states "which are used,
or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation,
sale, .... " and section 881(a)(7) states "which is used, or intended to be used in any
manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of .... " (emphasis
added). Neither section 881(a)(6) nor section 981(a)(l(A) contain the "in any man-
ner" broadening provision. Since these three subsections are all part of the same stat-
ute, and indeed the same paragraph, section 881 (a), it must be presumed that Congress
intended that they be treated differently.
52. All Monies (Leloach), 754 F. Supp. at 1475.
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2. Dirimex transferred funds into Leloach's account 38 times from
1987 through May 4, 1989 - only 23 days before the account was
seized. 3 $2,500,000 were tainted. The $2,500,000 laundered through
the defendant account was more than five times the amount actually
seized.""
3. Leloach used his account to transfer money not only to his cus-
tomers, but also to Dirimex's customers pursuant to the instructions of
Melendez and Melendez's associates at Dirimex.55 In fact, various de-
posits to and disbursements from Leloach's account had Melendez's
handwritten name entered by either the claimant or one of his employ-
ees. The claimant could not explain why Melendez's name was written
in his records and, in fact, contended that he dealt directly with an-
other person at Dirimex.5"
Based on the above facts, the court granted the government's mo-
tion for summary judgment on probable cause for forfeiture of the en-
tire account based on the facilitation theory under both 21 U.S.C. §
881(a)(6) and 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A). The court's discussion of the
factual basis for probable cause concerned exclusively the use of the
account to facilitate money laundering rather than drug trafficking. 57
The court did not distinguish between the nature of the underlying
criminal activity which must be facilitated in order to forfeit the ac-
count and did not attempt to explain how the account facilitated a vio-
lation of the drug laws as opposed to the money laundering laws. 58
What was the substantial connection between the portion of the
account which was not traceable to a narcotics transactions and the
narcotics transactions themselves? How did the clean money in the ac-
count make the underlying drug sales activity less difficult, less ob-
53. Id. at 1476. Leloach's records indicated, and apparently the government did
not contest, that out of approximately 370 deposits into his account in 1988 and 1989,
only 34 came from Dirimex. Id. at 1481. Since Dirimex was also a cambio and cambios
broker funds, the fact that the funds "came" from Dirimex does not mean they came
from an account titled Dirimex's name. The nature of the government's proof was not
that all of Dirimex's money was dirty, but rather that, on occasions, Dirimex brokered
funds supplied by Melendez. Further, many of the 34 deposits came from accounts
which the government did not seek to prove were affiliated with drug trafficking.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1474.
56. Id.
57. All Monies (Leloach), 754 F. Supp. at 1473-76.
58. Although unstated, the court appears to have concluded that if an account is
used to facilitate the laundering of drug proceeds it, ipsofacto, facilitates the underly-
ing drug crimes. The validity of this assumption is less than obvious.
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structed or less hindered? A possible answer may be found in the
court's conclusion that the account "provided a repository for the drug
proceeds in which the legitimate money could provide a 'cover' for
those proceeds, thus making it more difficult to trace the proceeds." 5
This answer, however, merely assumes that post-facto laundering of
drug proceeds facilitates the underlying crime itself. This conclusion is
not self-evident, especially in light of the other laws specifically
criminalizing such laundering activity (e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957)
and making such property forfeitable (e.g., § 981(a)(1)(A)).
All Monies (Leloach) is also significant because it is the first re-
ported decision finding that section 981(a)(1)(A) reaches property,
such as a bank account, which facilitates a violation of the predicate
statutes.60 Section 981(a)(1)(A) does not contain the word "facilitate."
Rather it makes forfeitable any property "involved" in a transaction or
attempted transaction in violation of the predicate acts. To graft the
facilitation theory onto section 981(a)(1)(A), the court looked to the
clear legislative intent "to include the money or other property laun-
dered (the corpus), any commissions or fees paid to the launderer, and
any property used to facilitate the laundering offense." 1
The' seizure of bank accounts based on allegations of money laun-
dering facilitation has been addressed in only one other reported deci-
59. Id. at 1475-76. Tracing the proceeds, however, does not make the actual
drug sales, the underlying criminal activity, less difficult, less obstructed or less hin-
dered. The difference between the nature of the criminal activities which must be facil-
itated under section 881(a)(6) and section 981(a)(l)(A) is one which received no at-
tention in All Monies (Leloach), probably because there was also a section
981(a)(I)(A) forfeiture claim. In any bank account case involving only a section
881(a)(6) seizure, this could be a critical distinction. However, since the enactment of
section 981(a)(I)(A) and in its revision in 1988, there is unlikely to be a bank account
seizure involving only section 881(a)(6).
60. Id. at 1473. Apparently, the first decision interpreting section 981(a)(1)(A)
to include facilitation is United States v. Real Property Including any Building Appur-
tenances and Improvement Thereon Located at 4643 W. Kennedy Boulevard, 1990
WL 305391 (M.D. Fla. February 12, 1990). The court denied emergency motions for
the return of property seized pursuant to section 981(a)(l)(A). The claimants argued
that seizure under section 981(a)(1)(A) was limited to the corpus, the amount actually
laundered, in this case $25,000, rather than the real estate and liquor licenses, in effect
the businesses of the claimants. The court upheld the seizure of the businesses based on
the legislative history authorizing seizure of property used to facilitate the laundering
offense. Id.
61. All Monies (Leloach), 754 F. Supp. at 1473 (citing 134 CONG. REC. S17365
(1988)).
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sion.62 In United States v. Certain Funds on Deposit in Account No.
01-0-71417, (Certain Funds) the government sought forfeiture of sev-
eral accounts under the direct control of alleged participants in a
scheme to illegally obtain credit union funds. 63 The account owners
transferred the tainted funds into the defendant accounts which had
previously contained only clean money.64 The claimants argued that the
government could seize only the amount that was traceable to the al-
leged illegal activity.6 5 The court rejected that argument, adopting the
government's contention that "limiting the forfeiture of funds under
the circumstances to the proceeds of the initial fraudulent activity
would effectively undermine the purpose of [section 981(a)(1)(A)]." 66
The court cited All Monies (Leloach) and held that clean money which
facilitated the money laundering was forfeitable: "[c]riminal activity
such as money laundering largely depends upon the use of legitimate
monies to advance or facilitate the scheme. It is precisely the commin-
gling of tainted funds with legitimate money that facilitates the laun-
dering and enables it to continue."67
Although no reported decisions other than All Monies (Leloach)
have addressed the facilitation argument in the context of bank ac-
counts which received money from parallel market purchases, there are
two unreported decisions addressing this point.68 Unlike All Monies
(Leloach), Certain Funds and United States v. Real Property Located
at 4643 W. Kennedy Blvd.,69 these two cases do not involve allegations
that the owners of the account were knowing participants in the under-
lying criminal activity.
In United States v. Security Pacific Int'l Bank Account No.
13934, the government seized a money market account with an approx-
62. United States v. Certain Funds on Deposit in Account No. 01-0-71417, 769
F. Supp. 80 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) [hereinafter Certain Funds].
63. Id. at 81-83.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 83.
66. Id. at 84.
67. Certain Funds, 769 F. Supp. at 84-85.
68. United States v. Security Pacific Int'l Bank Account No. 13934, No. 90-
2222-Civ-MARCUS (S.D. Fla. April 25, 1991); United States v. Certain Accounts,
Together with All Monies on Deposit Therein, No. 91-1018-Civ-KING (S.D. Fla. Feb-
ruary 21, 1992).
69. United States v. Certain Real Property Including Any Building Appurte-
nances Thereon Located at 4643 W. Kennedy Boulevard, 1990 WL 305391 (M.D. Fla.
Feb. 12, 1990).
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imate balance of $39,700 and a time deposit with an approximate bal-
ance of $740,000 after the claimant attempted to deposit 76 money
orders totalling $40,000 into a prior money market account. 70 He pur-
chased the money orders from a cambista in Barranquilla, Colombia.
His bank refused the deposit, in part because many of the money or-
ders were sequentially numbered. Pursuant to the claimant's request,
the bank returned the money orders and he sought a refund from the
cambista. The claimant returned the money orders to his cambista for
two refund checks which he deposited into his account. They were re-
turned unpaid. Approximately one month later, the claimant ex-
changed the two unpaid refund checks for five personal checks totalling
$39,000 from an associate of the cambista and deposited them into his
money market account. After the deposit of the five checks but before
the seizure, the claimant closed the account, opened a new money mar-
ket account, and transferred the contents of the former to the latter. 71
The court found that the following facts offered by the government
established probable cause to believe that the new money market ac-
count and the time deposit were used to facilitate money laundering
and structuring:
1. The cambista used by the claimant was involved in money laun-
dering. The seventy-six money orders originally intended for deposit
into the claimant's account were later sent for deposit to a bank in
New York by "criminal cohorts" of the "extensive money laundering
organization" who "whited-out" Security Pacific as the payee. a
2. The claimant's money market account automatically shifted its
contents into a time deposit at prearranged intervals so that interest
would accumulate at a higher rate and at the expiration of the time
deposit its contents were returned to the money market account.73
3. The IRS determined after the seizure of the accounts that the
associate of the cambista who gave the claimant the five checks for
$39,000 had other bank accounts which contained the proceeds of
structured activity74 and that the accounts contained three deposits to-
70. Order Denying Claimant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Security Pacific
Int'l Bank Account No. 13934, No. 90-2222-Civ-MARCUS (S.D. Fla. April 25, 1991)
(all the money orders were for amounts less than $10,000) [hereinafter Security
Pacific].
71. Id.
72. Id. at 10.
73. Id. at 11.
74. Id. The opinion is not clear but seems to indicate that the five checks actually
deposited in the claimant's account were not drawn from the bank accounts containing
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tailing $63,000 from Miami bank accounts of another individual in-
volved in the money laundering scheme."
In denying the claimant's motion for summary judgment because
there was a real dispute as to whether there was probable cause at the
time of the seizure, the court reasoned as follows:
The defendant accounts are property traceable to the scheme be-
cause of the attempted deposit of the seventy-six money orders with
Merlano's account number on the back. Additionally, Merlano has
apparently admitted that although the money orders were not de-
posited, he was able to "cash" the money orders with Mr. Logreira
[the man who gave him the five checks for $39,000 in exchange for
the two NSF checks from the cambista]. Further, the government
asserts, the bank accounts were roll over accounts directly tracea-
ble to the account into which the seventy-six money orders were to
be deposited. Based on these asserted facts, the government argues
that claimant's motion for summary judgment should be denied...
We agree .7
This decision is not carefully reasoned. Merlano's attempt to de-
posit the seventy-six money orders does not violate any predicate act
leading to forfeiture since there was no evidence that he acted with the
intent to launder the structuring proceeds. In fact, the government
agent testified that he had no knowledge or reason to believe that
Merlano was part of the "extensive money laundering organization" or
that he participated in "whiting-out" the money orders. 77 This admis-
sion alone should have deflated the facilitation claim.
Even assuming the cambista had the intent to launder funds when
she sold the money orders to Merlano, neither Merlano's original
money market account nor the funds contained therein were property
involved in an attempted money laundering transaction as a result of
the failed deposit. The cambista did not know the account the money
orders were going to be deposited into nor how much money was in
that account. What the court failed to take into account was that prop-
erty, in order to become tainted, must be used in an illicit manner by
proceeds of structured activity.
75. Security Pacific, No. 90-2222-Civ-MARCUS at 11-12. See also Supplemen-
tal Response to Claimants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 13, Security Pacific,
(March 5, 1991) and Reference No. 218199-005348 and the contents thereof (listing
the Castro amounts).
76. Security Pacific, No. 90-2222-Civ-MARCUS at 14.
77. Id. at 8.
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someone who has control of it. Although a person without wrongful
intent can have his property seized as traceable proceeds of property
which has been tainted by someone else, no other person can place a
taint on his previously clean property. The only property involved in an
attempted transaction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and, therefore,
subject to forfeiture, were the money orders themselves. If they had
been deposited into the account, the funds corresponding to their value
would have been seizable as traceable proceeds. However, the remain-
ing funds in the account would not have been seizable.
The court relied on information acquired post-seizure that
Merlano deposited the $39,000 arguably traceable to the attempted de-
posit and erroneously concluded that both of the "accounts [the new
money market and the time deposit - approximately $800,000] are
property traceable to the scheme .... -7" Based on the evidence avail-
able at the time of the seizure concerning the failed deposit of the
money orders and their ultimate attempted re-deposit, the government
did not have probable cause to seize anything. The seizure of the ac-
counts was, therefore, unlawful.7 9 Only $39,000 was properly traceable
to the new money market account. Funds are traceable only if, in fact,
they are transferred. Without Merlano's intent to launder the money,
the failed deposit does not lead to any traceable proceeds.8 0
Moreover, the only taint as to the $39,000 provided by Logreira in
the form of five checks, was that they were exchanged for two NSF
checks which were in turn exchanged for the seventy-six money orders.
78. Id. at 14.
79. The evidence concerning the actual deposit of the $39,000 was volunteered
by the claimant in an attempt to have his account freed. In addition, the evidence
regarding the other three deposits, which the government also contended were structur-
ing proceeds, came as a result of discovery during the case. Since all of the evidence
regarding money being rolled over or deposited into the accounts came as a result of an
unlawful seizure the evidence should have been suppressed. Since it was the only evi-
dence which would have supported seizure of any funds in the account, all of the funds
should have been released. See United States v. Six Hundred Thirty-Nine Thousand,
Five Hundred Fifty-Eight Dollars ($639,558) in U.S. Currency, 955 F.2d 712 (D.C.
Cir. 1992); United States v. One 1985 Cadillac Seville, 866 F.2d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir.
1989); United States v. One 1977 Mercedes Benz, 708 F.2d 444, 450 (9th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Certain Real Property on Hanson Brook, 770 F. Supp. 722 (D. Maine
1991); United States v. Leslie, 598 F. Supp. 254 (D. Vermont 1984).
80. The government used the facilitation argument in the previous cases to seize
an entire account where there was proof the account holder intentionally deposited
tainted funds for the purpose of commingling them with clean money and thereby fur-
thering the laundering activity. See supra text accompanying notes 36-56.
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Once the money orders were exchanged for the two NSF checks and
certainly by the time the two NSF checks were exchanged for the five
clean checks,81 the funds were, at most, property traceable to property
involved in an attempted structuring transaction rather than the prop-
erty involved in the attempted structuring violation itself. To conclude
that after several exchanges the five checks were still property involved
in the underlying attempted transaction, rather than merely property
traceable to such property, stretches the facilitation theory beyond the
breaking point. It would subject to seizure the full contents of the ac-
count into which the tainted funds were deposited and then all of the
funds in every subsequent account into which any funds from that first
account were deposited. The Security Pacific court applied the facilita-
tion theory in such a way that if a single tainted dollar can be traced
into an account, the entire account is seizable and every time a dollar
leaves that account it infects all of the funds in all future transferee
accounts, etc.82 This absurd result is a consequence of the court's fail-
ure to limit the facilitation theory to accounts under the control of a
wrongdoer.
A recent unreported decision which does a better job of parsing
the complicated provisions of section 981 (a)(1)(A) is United States v.
Certain Accounts, Together with All Monies on Deposit Therein. 3
The district court granted various claimants' motions to dismiss the
government's verified complaint based on facts similar to those present
in Security Pacific. In Certain Accounts, the government sought the
81. The fact that the remitter of the five checks also had bank accounts, other
than the one from which he drew the five checks, which contained proceeds of struc-
tured activity, may make the five checks suspicious but it certainly does not give rise to
probable cause to believe that they are also proceeds of structured activity.
If, as the opinion implies but does not make clear, the claimants' new money mar-
ket account received deposits directly from other accounts containing the proceeds of
structured activity, then it would be subject to forfeiture but only to the extent of the
amount of the deposits. The only basis for seizure of the entire $740,000 in the time
deposit would have been if the deposits to the money market account traceable to the
structured activity totalled $800,000 and all of those funds were transferred from the
money market account to the time deposit prior to seizure.
This case was settled with the claimant forfeiting $125,000 approximately
$900,000 (with interest). The amount forfeited is roughly the amount of all the argua-
bly traceable deposits plus interest.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Pole No. 3172, Hopkinton, 852 F.2d 636, 639 (1st
Cir. 1988) ("forfeitability does not spread like a disease from one infected mortgage
payment to the entire interest in the property acquired prior to the payment").
83. No. 91-1018-Civ-KING (S.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 1992).
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forfeiture of entire account balances of thirty-one Miami bank ac-
counts, twenty-seven of which, the "indirect recipient" accounts, had
received funds from the other four and from an unidentified number of
New York "direct recipient" accounts into which structured deposits
were placed. Checks drawn on the direct recipient accounts were signed
by the account-holder in blank and transported to Medellin, Colombia
and Caracas, Venezuela where they were subsequently made payable
to the claimants of the indirect recipient accounts and deposited into
their accounts. 4
The court held that the entire balance of the direct recipient ac-
counts was property "involved in" the crime of money laundering and,
therefore, subject to forfeiture. Secondly, the court found that the
checks written on the direct recipient accounts were property "tracea-
ble to" property "involved in" money laundering.85 The court, however,
rejected the effort to forfeit the entire balances in the indirect recipient
accounts, rather than just the amounts traceable to the direct recipient
accounts. The government argued that the entire contents of the indi-
rect recipient accounts were property involved in money laundering be-
cause they were facilitating the concealment of the tainted one. The
court characterized the argument as creating a syllogism under which a
tainted deposit from direct recipient account would subject all the
funds in the indirect recipient accounts, and any subsequent accounts
into which they were transferred, to forfeiture. Under the theory pro-
posed by the government, no separate showing of "taint," i.e., intent to
launder money, other than the mere tracing of tainted funds would be
required to seize the entire balance in the indirect recipient account. 6
As the court observed:
Like a contagious disease, each direct account could contaminate
any account that had dealings with it. The indirect accounts could
then conceivably pass on the infection to other accounts, and so
forth ad infinitum. The outer limits of this theory would be
bounded only by Plaintiff's imagination.
This court rejects such a theory. The government's argument here
would stretch facilitation theory - itself something of a bootstrap
- to the breaking point. As the account in question becomes more
distant from the initial illegal transaction, so too does probable
cause to forfeit become more attenuated. This court holds that the
84, Id. at 3.
85. Id. at 13.
86. Id.
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government must allege facts other than the mere tracing of checks
written against a suspect account. Under the Supplemental Rules,
therefore, additional facts that give rise to the requisite "reasonable
belief" that there is "substantial connection" to money laundering
must be pled with particularity. A contrary rule would yield unten-
able results.8 7
During oral argument on the motions to dismiss, the court posed a hy-
pothetical question: "If money from demonstrably dirty accounts was
used to make unsolicited $50 donations to Miami police officers, would
the government have probable cause to seize the entire balances of all
of those officers' accounts?"88 The government responded affirmatively
citing as safeguards to an unjust result its discretion in bringing the
suit and the innocent owner defense. The court noted that these safe-
guards were inadequate stating "[t]he Supplemental Rules guarantee
protection above and beyond plaintiff's good judgment, however well
intentioned it may be."89 As alluded to by the government in Certain
Accounts, the claimant's ultimate defense is innocent ownership.90
C. Innocent Ownership
Claimants to property seized under sections 881(a)(6) or
87. Id. at 13-14 (emphasis in original). In a footnote the court added: "This
holding does not mean that money launderers may insulate themselves from the forfei-
ture laws by adding more layers to their financial network. The court simply holds that
the government must provide some reasonable basis to conclude that probable cause
can be shown as to each layer at trial, without sole reliance on the fact of transfer from
one account to another." Id. at 14 n.11.
88. Certain Account, No. 91-1018-Civ-KING at 14 n.12 (summarizing the hypo-
thetical question which is paraphrased based on the recollection of the several observers
present at hearing).
89. Id. The court dismissed the complaint as to the entire balance of all the
indirect recipient accounts with leave to amend. The government then attempted to
settle some of the twenty-seven cases on the basis that the amount it could trace into
the indirect recipient accounts would be forfeited and the balance would be returned
with interest. For the claims it did not settle, the government filed new complaints
against only the traceable amounts, or where it had some evidence of facilitation, it
filed against the entire account balances.
90. There are those who have not derived much comfort from this safeguard
since it places the burden on the claimant to prove a negative, that she did not know
the funds were derived from drug trafficking or one of the other specified predicate
crimes. Moreover, the government maintains possession of the funds during the
litigation.
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981(a)(1)(A) may defeat forfeiture if they prove not just that they are
innocent of the underlying crime but also that their ownership of the
seized property is innocent. This section attempts to explain how a per-
son wholly innocent of any predicate act under section 881(a)(6) or
section 981(a)(1)(A) might fail to qualify as an innocent owner.
Under section 881(a)(6) no property shall be forfeited "by reason
of an), act or omission established by [its] owner to have been commit-
ted or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner." This
innocent owner provision was enacted to clarify the "original language
which could have been construed to reach properties traceable to the
illegal proceeds but obtained by an innocent party without knowledge
of the matter in which the proceeds were obtained."9 The legislative
intent was further clarified by Senator Culver who said it was written
"in order to protect the individual who obtains ownership of proceeds
with no knowledge of the illegal transaction." ' Section 981(a)(2) pro-
vides the same innocent owner defense as section 881(a)(6) except that
it is limited to the claimant's lack of knowledge, making no provision
for lack of consent."3 Section 981(a)(2) has not been construed by a
circuit court of appeals and has no legislative history. Therefore, the
innocent owner provisions are not discussed separately below because
there is no analytical basis to distinguish section 981(a)(2) from the
knowledge component of section 881(a)(6).
Despite the relatively straight forward language used in the stat-
utes and the statement of purpose in the legislative history, the circuit
courts of appeal do not appear to agree on the nature of the claimant's
burden in proving lack of knowledge. The First, Fourth and Sixth Cir-
cuits, as suggested by the plain language of the statute and its legisla-
tive history, have held that a claimant must show only that he did not
have actual knowledge that the property to be forfeited was the pro-
91. Remarks of Senator Culver, 124 CONG. REc. 23056 (1978).
92. Id. Senator Nunn added that the purpose of the innocent owner provision
was "to make it clear that a bona fide party who has no knowledge or consent to the
property he owns having been derived from an illegal transaction, that party would be
able to establish that fact under this amendment and forfeiture would not occur." Re-
marks of Senator Sam Nunn, 124 CONG. REc. 23057 (1978).
93. Title 18 U.S.C. section 981(a)(2) explicitly provides that a lienholder who
was without knowledge of the illegal activity may also qualify as a innocent owner:
"No property shall be forfeited under this section to the extent of the interest of an
owner or lienholder by reason of any act or omission established by that owner or
lienholder to have been committed without the knowledge of that owner or lienholder."
However, there is no legislative history available on section 981(a)(2).
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ceed of the underlying criminal activity.94 The Fifth Circuit may also
have adopted the actual knowledge standard.96 However, a claimant
who remains free from actual knowledge of the illegal acts underlying
a traceable proceed by "sticking his head in the sand" will be deemed
to have the requisite knowledge. 96
The Second Circuit has not interpreted the section 881(a)(6) inno-
cent owner provision but in section 881(a)(7) cases a claimant must
show that either she did not have actual knowledge or, if she did, that
she did not consent to the illegal use of her real property. 97 If the
claimant has actual knowledge, in order to be an innocent owner she
must prove a lack of consent by showing she did all that could reasona-
bly be expected to prevent the illegal activity once she learned of it.98
In the context of a section 881(a)(6) case these circuits are likely to
follow the actual knowledge standard. 99
94. United States v. One Urban Lot Located at 1 Street A-I Valparaiso,
Bayamon, Puerto Rico, 865 F.2d 427, 430 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Lots 12,
13, 14 and 15, Keeton Heights Subdivision, Morgan County, Kentucky, 869 F.2d 942,
946-47 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. $10,694.00 U.S. Currency, 828 F.2d 233-34
(4th Cir. 1987) (discussing section 881(a)(6)).
95. United States v. Lot 9, Block 2 of Donnybrook Place, Harris County, Texas,
919 F.2d 994, 999 (5th Cir. 1990) (discussing section 881(a)(7)).
96. United States v. 1980 Red Ferrari, VIN No. 9A0034335, Oregon License
No. GPN-835, 827 F.2d 477, 480 (9th Cir. 1987)[hereinafter 1980 Red Ferrari].
97. United States v. Certain Real Property (890 Noyac Road), 945 F.2d 1252,
1260 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Certain Real Property (418 57 Street), 922 F.2d
129, 131-32 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. 141st Street Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 876-
880 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 1017 (1991).
98. 141st Street Corp., 911 F.2d at 879.
99. The Second Circuit read the "without the knowledge or consent" language of
section 881(a)(7) in the disjunctive. That is, if the claimant fails to prove the absence
of actual knowledge, she can still prevail if she shows that she did not consent to the
use of the property for an illegal purpose. It involves owners of property whose occu-
pants (tenant or husband) who used the real property in an illegal manner subjecting it
to seizure. Once knowledge has been established, in order to give meaning to the term
consent, the courts have imposed a duty on the claimant to prove that instead of merely
acquiescing in the illegal conduct, which would have been consent, they took affirma-
tive steps to prevent it. In other words, once knowledge has been established a claimant
would automatically lose on the consent issue, unless she demonstrates that she took
affirmative action to stop the illegal activity. Without imposing this requirement, the
alternative available to the claimant of showing consent becomes meaningless. A claim-
ant should prevail on an innocent ownership claim under section 881(a)(6) if they
demonstrate their lack of knowledge and the government is unable to rebut that
showing.
The Third Circuit has also adopted the disjunctive approach to section 881(a)(7)
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'Whether or not a claimant must do more than disprove actual
knowledge that the funds were proceeds of specified illegal transactions
is not clear in the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits due to inconsistent and
ambiguous holdings.' 00 In its first section 881(a)(6) innocent owner de-
cision the Ninth Circuit required the claimant to prove the absence of
actual knowledge, did not mention a negligence or all reasonable efforts
test and found on the facts presented that the circumstantial evidence
of knowledge was compelling.' 0' However, in its next section 881(a)(6)
decision, the court did not cite its prior decision or analyze the issue
before announcing that the claimant's failure to exercise due care pre-
cluded reliance upon the innocent owner defense. 102 Not only is this
latter decision suspect for its failure to address the plain language of
section 881(a)(6) and the legislative history, but it cites as support a
Ninth Circuit decision involving section 881(a)(4) in 1977 prior to the
amendment to section 881(a)(4) adding a statutory innocent owner de-
fense.' In a January 1992 unpublished decision, the Ninth Circuit,
without citing to either of its prior section 881(a)(6) cases, applied the
actual knowledge test.' 0
4
In the Eleventh Circuit, like in theNinth Circuit, the quantum of
knowledge necessary to be an innocent owner is not clear at this time.
but sidestepped the issue of whether "knowledge" means actual knowledge. United
States v Parcel of Real Property Known as 6109 Grubb Road, Millcreek Township,
Erie County, Pa., 886 F.2d 618, 626 (3d Cir. 1989). The trial court had adopted an
actual knowledge test. Grubb Road, 708 F. Supp. at 698, 702 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
100. There are no definitive decisions in the Third, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and
D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeal on the section 881(a)(6) innocent owner standards.
101. 1980 Red Ferrari, 827 F.2d at 478-79.
102. United States v. $215,300, U.S. Currency, 882 F.2d 417, 420 (9th Cir.
1989) (citing United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet Blazer, 563 F.2d 1386, 1389 (9th
Cir. 1977)).
103. Id. Section 881(a)(4) was not amended until November 18, 1988 to pro-
vide for an innocent owner defense. See Pub. L. 100-690, § 6075(l)-(3), 102 Stat.
4181, 4,324 (1988).
In United States v. One Parcel of Land, Known as Lot 11 I-B, Tax Map Key 4-4-
30-71 (4), Waipouli, Kapaa, Island and County of Kauai, State of Hawaii, 902 F.2d
1443 (9th Cir. 1990), the court seemed to adopt an actual knowledge standard in a
section 881(a)(7) case. Id. at 1445 (the intent of the forfeiture statute "would be sub-
stantially undercut if persons who are fully aware of the illegal connection or source of
their property were permitted to reclaim the property as 'innocent' owners.") (rejecting
the disjunctive reading of knowledge or consent in requiring the claimant to prove both
that he did not know nor did he consent to the illegal activities).
104. United States v. U.S. Currency, $584,091, 952 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir. 1992)
(unpublished disposition text in WESTLAW).
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In its first section 881(a)(6) decision addressing innocent ownership,
the court explicitly stated that the standard was actual knowledge
rather than constructive knowledge. 10 5 In the footnote following this
statement the court questioned the government's invocation of Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,106 which articulated a constitu-
tional defense to forfeiture if a claimant could show that "he had done
all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of
his property." However, in the same footnote the court concluded that
because it found that the claimant failed to meet the actual knowledge
standard it would "leave for another day the question of the applicabil-
ity of the Calero-Toledo dicta to forfeiture actions under 21 U.S.C.
section 881(a)(6).' 10 7
Five years later the court seemed to adopt the actual knowledge
test for the application of the innocent owner provision in a section
881(a)(7) case.108 The following year in another section 881(a)(7) case,
the court explicitly held that "[a]pplication of the innocent owner de-
fense turns on the claimant's actual, rather than constructive, knowl-
edge."109 Then, just two months later in United States v. One Single
Family Residence Located at 15603 85th Avenue North, Lake Park,
Palm Beach, County Florida (15603 85th Avenue North), a panel of
the Eleventh Circuit including one of the same judges who had just
adopted the actual knowledge test, applied the "reasonably possible"
language of Calero-Toledo to an unusual section 881(a)(6) case.110
In 15603 85th Avenue N., two brothers contributed funds to the
construction of a house that they owned jointly. The district court
found that the funds of the bad brother were exclusively the product of
drug trafficking, but that the funds of the good brother were from legit-
imate sources. However, the district court also concluded that the good
brother had actual knowledge that his brother's funds were derived
from drug trafficking. The Eleventh Circuit held that legitimate funds
are forfeitable when they are knowingly commingled with bad funds."'
105. $4,255,000.00, 762 F.2d at 906.
106. 416 U.S. 663 (1974)
107. $4,255,000.00, 762 F.2d at 906 n.24.
108. United States v. One Single Family Residence, Located at 15621 S.W.
209th Ave., Miami, Florida, 894 F.2d 1511, 1513 (11th Cir. 1990).
109. United States v. Real Property at 5000 Palmetto Dr., Fort Pierce, St. Lucie
County, Florida, 928 F.2d 373, 375 (1 1th Cir. 1991) (citing $4,255,00.00, 762 F.2d at
906).
110. 933 F.2d 976, 982 (11th Cir. 1991) (footnote omitted).
111. Id. at 982.
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After finding that the "good brother" had actual knowledge of the
commingling of legitimate and drug funds, the court held he could still
be spared forfeiture as an innocent owner if he proved that he did eve-
rything reasonably possible to withdraw his commingled funds or dis-
pose of the property upon learning of the illegal nature of the other
funds.11
The court's decision can be interpreted as upholding the actual
knowledge test while at the same time allowing a claimant who has
actual knowledge of the illegal source of the funds to show that he did
not consent to commingling his legitimate funds with those from an
illegal source. This is essentially the same approach that the Second
and Third Circuits have followed. 113 On the other hand, the court did
hold the "reasonably possible" language of Calero-Toledo applicable to
a section 881(a)(6) case for the first time.""
The failure of the Ninth Circuit, and possibly the Eleventh, to fol-
low the plain language of the statute and instead impose a negligence
standard derives from the Supreme Court's dicta in Calero-Toledo. In
this 1974 decision, a pleasure yacht was leased by its owners to Puerto
Rican citizens. Fourteen months after it was leased, Puerto Rican au-
thorities discovered one marijuana cigarette on board and sought its
forfeiture pursuant to a Puerto Rican forfeiture statute.1 5 The authori-
ties conceded that the yacht's owner was not involved in the lessee's
activities and "had no knowledge that its property was being used in
connection with, or in violation of [Puerto Rican law]." 6 Recognizing
the extraordinarily harsh result of allowing forfeiture of the yacht
under such circumstances, the court noted the existence of "serious
constitutional questions.""'  One such constitutional question was
whether an owner who proved not only that she was uninvolved in and
unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that she had done all that
reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of her prop-
erty, could suffer its forfeiture." 8
112. Id. (citing 141st Street Corp., 911 F.2d at 878-879).
113. See 141st Street Corp., 911 F.2d at 876-80; Grubb Road, 886 F.2d at 626.
114. Id.
115. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 1663, 1664-65, 1694
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
116. 416 U.S. at 668.
117. Id. at 689.
118. Id. The Court rejected the application of this defense in the case stating "no
allegation has been made or proof offered that the company did all that it could reason-
ably do to avoid having its property put to an unlawful use." Id. at 690. In other words,
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Unlike section 881(a)(6) and section 981(a)(2), the Puerto Rican
statute at issue in Calero-Toledo did not provide a statutory innocent
owner defense. The dicta in Calero-Toledo, therefore, must be read as
a defense of last resort. In other words, it is only applicable as a saving
provision, when there is no statutory innocent owner defense. There is
simply no legitimate basis to substitute a negligence test based on a
constitutional defense for a statutory defense which specifically requires
that a claimant only prove that she did not know or consent to the
illegal activity.
There is no suggestion in the legislative history of section
881(a)(6) to explain or justify the basis for a negligence standard in
the place of an actual knowledge standard. In fact, the enactment of
the statutory innocent owner defense after Calero-Toledo has been in-
terpreted as a congressional rejection of such a heavy burden.'1 9 More-
over, the First and Sixth Circuits which have adopted the actual knowl-
edge standard have explicitly rejected the application of the "all
reasonable efforts" test.12
0
D. Application of the Innocent Owner Defense in Parallel Mar-
ket Cases
In a case involving a Colombian cambio which received cash from
its customers, the Eleventh Circuit applied the actual knowledge stan-
dard and affirmed the forfeiture of more than $4,255,000 in a bank
account and more than $3,686,000 in cash. 21 More than $240,000,000
because the claimant had not raised a constitutional claim for which there was no prior
case law support, it was sunk.
119. 316 Units of Municipal Securities, 725 F. Supp. at 180.
120. One Urban Lot, 865 F.2d at 430 (unlike Calero-Toledo, "we have a statute
that provides for an exception for innocent owners. 21 U.S.C. section 881(a)(6). This
statute does not in any way limit innocent owners to those who have done all that
reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of the property. Calero-
Toledo. In fact, the statute specifically refers to the knowledge and consent of the
owner as the appropriate considerations in determining who is accepted."); Lots 12, 13,
14, and 15, 869 F.2d at 947 ("[t]he constitutional question [raised in Calero-Toledol
is not presented here, because the statute with which we are concerned [section
881(a)(7)] imposes no requirement that a person who claims the status of an innocent
owner establish that he has done all that he could reasonably be expected to do to
prevent the proscribed use of his property").
121. $4,255,000, 762 F.2d at 902. Although the Eleventh Circuit decision indi-
cates in one place that the $4,255,000 was currency, it indicates the to the contrary at
a later reference and the district court decision is consistent with the latter reference.
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in cash was deposited to the defendant account in less than eight
months. 122 In addition to the numbing amount of money involved and
the fact that it was all in cash, the claimant made several statements
and made one request of the bank demonstrating his "gnawing belief
that the funds being dealt with were tainted. ' 123 Since $4,255,000 is a
case with facts which are not likely to be repeated and involve the
cambista himself, it is of limited predictive value in determining the
limits of actual knowledge.
There are however two instructive decisions among the Hawaii All
Monies cases. In All Monies (Leloach), the claimant was a Peruvian
cambista who bought his dollars from another cambista. 2" Considering
itself bound by the Ninth Circuit's decision in $215,300, the district
court required the claimant to prove not only that he did not know of
the illegal activity or willfully blind himself to it, but also that he "did
all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the illegal use of his
account."' 12 5
The facts examined by the court focused on the legitimacy of the
claimant's money exchange business. The court appears to have broken
down the concept of legitimacy into two issues: whether the currency
exchange business itself was legitimate and then whether Leloach's
cambio in particular was legitimate. The court accepted Leloach's con-
tention that his business operated within the monetary laws in Peru,
but was unable to resolve whether or not the company violated Peru-
vian anti-flight capital laws. 26 The court then examined whether the
claimant's cambio account was under the effective control of the money
laundering organization. The court found numerous admissible facts in-
dicating that it may have been under the actual control of Dirimex,
another Peruvian cambio, as well as the particular partner of Dirimex
who was the money launderer.1 27 The court also noted several facially
See 762 F.2d at 898, 904; 551 F. Supp. at 316 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
122. $4,255,000, 762 F.2d at 904.
123. Id. at 906. Claimant approached the vice president of the bank and asked if
the government could seize the account. When advised that such a seizure was possible,
the claimant asked if the bank would make his company a loan to cover the funds on
deposit in the account in order to thwart a forfeiture. This conversation took place six
months before the seizure. Id. at 900.
124. 754 F. Supp. at 1482 (for pertinent facts of this case, see supra text accom-
panying notes 53-57).
125. Id. at 1478.
126. Id. at 1478-79
127. Id. at 1479-80.
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suspicious aspects of claimant's conduct of his money exchange busi-
ness, but acknowledged the claimant's explanations and denied both
the claimant's and the government's motions for summary judgment on
the innocent ownership defense.128
The innocent owner issue was resolved favorably to the claimant in
All Monies (Abusada), who also purchased tainted dollars from
Dirimex, but for personal use rather than in a commercial setting. 2 9 In
All Monies (Abusada), the court granted the claimants' summary judg-
ment motion because they met their burden of establishing their inno-
cent ownership defense. 130 The claimants produced unrefuted business
records indicating that the transfers into their account were made
through what they believed was a legitimate money exchange house.
Claimants also swore they had no knowledge of the drug trafficker or
of his illegal operation.' With respect to the money transferred into
their account which the government contended was tainted, the claim-
ants presented evidence that they paid for those transfers with money
from their domestic Peruvian bank accounts.1 32 In short, the govern-
128. United States v. All Monies ($477,048.62) in Account No. 90-3617-3,
Israel Discount Bank, New York, New York, 754 F. Supp. 1467, 1479 (D. Haw.
1991). The cambio's dollar bank account was maintained in New York, the records
were kept there, the claimant never saw the records personally, and when the claim-
ant's wife went to New York, she destroyed the records. The claimant did not want any
paper trail in Peru connecting him with wealth because people who are known to be
wealthy are subject to violence, kidnapping and extortion. Id. The claimant admitted
that he never asked the people from Dirimex where they obtained their dollars. He
contended, however, that such questions would have been futile because of the common
practice of Peruvian cambistas to guard the confidentiality of their sources. Id. at 1480.
He also offered two reasons for that confidentiality: a cambista who discloses his source
can lose it to a competitor and inquiry into the sources of money may compromise the
physical safety of both the clients and the people asking the questions because of the
violence which can result if personal wealth becomes known. Id.
Of approximately 370 deposits into the subject account in 1988 and 1989, only 34
were the product of transactions between the claimant and Dirimex. Moreover, many
of the 34 deposits came from accounts as to which the government did not offer any
evidence to prove they were affiliated with drug trafficking.
129. 746 F. Supp. at 1440.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. In fact, at the time of seizure the government was unable to trace any
tainted funds in the account. Approximately one year later, the government was able to
trace approximately one-third of the account balance to allegedly tainted accounts. The
court then held that an illegal seizure would not preclude forfeiture so long as the
government could establish probable cause for the forfeiture without using evidence
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ment failed to present evidence to rebut the claimants' proof that they
neither knew nor consented "to any of the illegal activity taking place
with respect to the defendant account."'' 3
In the context of a bank account seizure, the illegal activity which
the claimant must actually know of can only mean that the funds de-
posited into the account were proceeds of drug trafficking or money
laundering. If the claimant is "without knowledge of the matter in
which the proceeds were obtained" he is an innocent owner."" A for-
eign owner does not lose his innocence merely because he knows that
the funds coming into his account were involved in a violation of a
capital flight restriction, a currency exchange regulation or a tax law of
his country. 35
Once the claimant testifies that he did not know the dollars he
purchased from the cambista were proceeds of drug trafficking or
money laundering and the government has no evidence to show that his
purchase was anything other than a typical parallel market purchase,
can the government properly argue that the mere act of purchasing
dollars on the parallel market demonstrates knowledge that the dollars
purchased were tainted by drug crimes or money laundering? Clearly
not. The appropriate inquiry is a subjective one: whether the claimant
in a particular case had the requisite knowledge, not whether some
tainted funds are laundered through the parallel market. Because virtu-
ally no claimant knows he is buying tainted money, whether a particu-
lar claimant has the requisite knowledge will turn, in almost all cases,
on whether he was willfully blind.
In the legislative history of the Money Laundering Control Act of
1986, Congress gave explicit guidance on what would constitute knowl-
edge in the money laundering context by citing" 6 the leading case on
willful blindness: United States v. Jewel. 37 In considering willful blind-
ness to be the equivalent of knowledge, the Jewel court emphasized
that the requisite state of mind was only different from positive knowl-
tainted by the illegal seizure. Id. at 1438 (citing United States v. One 1985 Cadillac
Seville, 866 F.2d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. One 1977 Mercedes
Benz, 708 F.2d 444, 450 (9th Cir. 1983)).
133. Id.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
135. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 1992) (laws requiring filing of cur-
rency transaction reports, forbidding structuring of deposits, money laundering, or en-
gaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity).
136. SENATE REP. 99-433 at 9-10.
137. 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976).
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edge "so far as necessary to encompass a calculated effort to avoid the
sanction of the statutes while violating its substance."1 38 Congress elab-
orated on this definition of knowledge by giving contrasting examples:
Thus a currency exchanger who participates in a transaction with a
known drug dealer involving hundreds of thousands of dollars in
cash and accepts a commission far above the market rate, could not
escape conviction, from the first tier of the offense, simply by
claiming that he did not know for sure that the currency involved
in the transaction was derived from crime. On the other hand, an
automobile car dealer who sells a car at market rates to a person
whom he merely suspects of involvement with crime, cannot be
convicted of the offense in the absence of a showing that he knew
something more about the transaction or the circumstances sur-
rounding it.' 39
To prove innocent ownership a claimant must credibly testify only
that he did not know his cambista had any involvement in money laun-
dering. The claimant must do no more. Requiring a claimant to have
asked the cambista where he purchased his dollars would be an exer-
cise in futility. Commercial considerations render it futile.14 A
138. Id. at 704 (citation omitted).
139. SENATE REP., supra note 137. While the Senate's examples are given in the
context of criminal mens rea, the same standard of knowledge should apply in a civil
forfeiture setting. After all, in civil forfeitures it is the claimant who has the burden of
proving the absence of the requisite knowledge.
Large numbers of foreign citizens' accounts have been seized and subjected to
forfeiture until they could prove that the government had not properly traced the funds
or that they were innocent owners. In contrast, very few car dealership accounts have
been seized; why not more? Could it be that car dealers have more political clout than
non-residents? Imagine the howls of protest in Washington if 680 or even 88 had their
operating accounts seized the same day. Does the government merely give car dealers
or jewelers, rather than Colombians and Peruvians, the benefit of the doubt? Is it is
because the example given by the Senate could be superficially read to condemn cur-
rency exchangers and exonerate car dealers? Seriously though, there is a shared per-
ception in Colombia that innocent Colombian citizens are being made the scapegoats
for the failure of the United States to conquer its drug problem.
140. Cynics might argue that is futile because a crooked cambista will never
indicate that his sources are drug traffickers and money launderers. Assume a claimant
had asked his cambista to identify the sources of his dollars and the cambista re-
sponded by saying that he got his dollars from tourists, exporters of legitimate goods
who did not declare all of their receipts, wealthy Colombians/ Peruvians (that he per-
sonally knows are not involved in drug trafficking or money laundering) who want to
exchange their dollars for pesos/intis in order to repatriate their capital, etc. Surely a
1158 [Vol. 1 6
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cambista is a broker. If he reveals his source of funds he runs the risk
that his customers will deal directly with each other."" Additionally,
the identification of sources of wealth is also discouraged if not outright
refused because of the violence in the form of extortion, kidnapping
and sometimes murder of wealthy individuals.'42 So long as the claim-
ant has a good faith belief that he is not buying the proceeds of drug
trafficking or money laundering, his account should be immune from
forfeiture under the current state of the law. Purchasing in the face of
suspicion that some of the funds available on the parallel market are
tainted does not rise to willful blindness that the dollars his cambio is
selling are, in fact, tainted. Even in Congress' example the car dealer
who merely suspected his customer of involvement with crime, did not
have the requisite knowledge. 4"
In the few claims still unresolved from Operation Polar Cap (IV)
as well as in the All Monies cases, the government has attempted to
defeat the innocent owner defense by expert testimony as to the per-
centage of tainted funds in the Colombian and Peruvian parallel mar-
kets. While it is beyond the scope of this article to opine on the validity
of the research methods used to calculate such results, it should be
noted that the estimates range from 25 percent to 60 percent on the
Colombian parallel market.'" The actual percentage of tainted funds
in the parallel markets is a subject of intense debate. 4 5 Since the ac-
tual numbers are inherently unknowable any precisely stated percent-
age is unreliable.
While the actual percentage may be debated by economists and
statisticians, the actual number is irrelevant for purposes of an innocent
owner defense. It is the claimant's knowledge, not the expert's, that is
relevant. A claimant may believe that drug traffickers launder money
in the parallel market. However, if he has never had, and is not aware
of any specific instances where his cambista has dealt in tainted funds,
that should be sufficient to satisfy an actual knowledge/willful blind-
claimant is not under an affirmative obligation to confirm the truth of the cambista's
statement. See, e.g., Banco Cafetero; 797 F.2d at 1162 (claimant bank has no duty to
investigate the source of its customer's deposits).
141. See All Monies (Leloach), 754 F. Supp. at 1480.
142. Id. at 1479.
143. See supra text accompanying note 140.
144. Grosse, Colombia's Black Market and Foreign Exchange, forthcoming in
WORLD DEVELOPMENT (1992).
145. See Deposition of Norman Bailey at 4, Eighty-Eight (88) Designated Ac-
counts, No. 90-1203-Civ-NESBITT (S.D. Fla. January 29, 1991).
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ness standard. To insist on more than that would, at a minimum, entail
the application of the defense of last resort, the constitutionally based
negligence standard. As discussed above, this is not the standard appli-
cable to a statute which specifically provides an innocent owner
defense. 146
IV. CONCLUSION
The government has probably seized more than five hundred bank
accounts based on purchases of dollars in the parallel markets of Latin
America without any reason to believe that the owners of these ac-
counts knew of the drug trafficking or money laundering source of some
of the deposits. In terms of case specific results, this policy and its exe-
cution have been a dismal failure. More than 95 percent of the funds
seized have been returned to claimants who are not themselves cambis-
tas based on defenses of a lowest intermediate balance and/or innocent
ownership. The government's lack of selectivity in applying the facilita-
tion theory has resulted in the seizure of entire accounts instead of only
seizing the traceable proceeds. Such prosecutorial indiscretion has im-
posed significant hardship on hundreds if not thousands of innocent by-
standers in our war on drugs. Whether the in terrorem effect of such
improvident actions truly jeopardizes the activities of the real money
launderers or merely staggers our international banking and investment
communities by driving innocent owners to other shores remains to be
seen.
146. See notes 91, 115, 116 and surrounding text.
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